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INTRODUCTION
Under American law, the right of an individual from a religious minority to worship
freely is embodied in the First Amendment of the US Constitution, which says that “Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech...or the right of the people peaceably to assemble.” 1
In doing so, the First Amendment protects not only an individual’s freedom of conscience, it also
protects the right of religious communities to worship communally and ensures that the
government will be at least facially neutral with regard to religion. Though the protections
offered by the First Amendment are occasionally in tension with one another, they all reflect a

1

US Const, Amend I.
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concern with “safeguard[ing] the freedom of conscience and belief” and ensuring that individuals
are able to participate in public life regardless of religious beliefs. 2
Today, most democratic systems guarantee (at least on paper) a government that is
neutral with respect to religion. However, this guarantee takes several forms. In the United
States, the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment has been interpreted to ensure that
“[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which
aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.” 3 It also does not allow the
government to “force []or influence a person to go to or to remain way from church against his
will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.” 4 The government has limited
rights, even on public land and in public schools, to prevent individuals from expressing their
religious beliefs or to prohibit religious groups from engaging in the political process through
lobbying. As such, religious groups play a key role in the American political system. 5
In contrast, the system of Laïceté in France is ostensibly designed to satisfy the same
ends as the religion clauses of the Constitution - to ensure that all citizens are free to participate
in public life regardless of religion but takes a very different form. Unlike the American system,
the Laïceté system prohibits religious groups from engaging directly in politics while preventing
the government from recognizing any particular religion. Similarly, individuals are encouraged
to be discrete about their religious beliefs, and the French government has gone so far as to ban

2

See McCreary County, Kentucky v ACLU of Kentucky, 545 US 844, 881-82 (2005), O’Connor concurring.
Everson v Board of Education of Ewing Township, 330 US 1, 15 (1947).
4
Id.
5
See generally, Julie Butters, Why Americans Can’t Separate Religion and Politics and what it means for the 2016
election, *1 (College of Arts and Sciences at Boston University, 2015), archived at
http://www.bu.edu/cas/magazine/fall15/america/.
3
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the explicit and overt display of religious symbols by individuals in public spaces. 6 Other states
have adopted different mechanisms to safeguard the same right.
However, international law has also taken steps to guarantee the broader right of freedom
of religion. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that all individuals have “the right
to freedom of thought, conscience and religion,” including the “freedom to change his religion or
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship, and observance.” 7 The same
statement was incorporated into Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. 8
Though not embodied explicitly in other areas of international law, this right to free
exercise of religion has been incorporated by reference into both the Genocide Convention 9 and
the Refugee Convention. 10 Both include religious minorities among the kinds of groups that are
protected by the convention: the Genocide Convention criminalizes “acts committed with the
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a...religious group” 11 while the Refugee Convention
includes in the definition of refugee anyone who “owing to a well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of...religion...is outside the country of his nationality...or...is unwilling to
avail himself to the protection of that country.” 12 While the Genocide and Refugee Convention

6

For a more detailed discussion of the Laïceté system, see generally James A. Beckford, Laïceté, ‘Dystopia,’ and
the Reaction to New Religious Movements in France, in James T. Richardson, ed, Regulating Religion, Case Studies
from Around the Globe, 27 (Kluwer Academic 2004).
7
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 18, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, 10
December 1948.
8
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 18.
9
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly, 9 December 1948.
10
Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Resolution 2198 adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly, 28 July 1951.
11
Genocide Convention, Art. II, cited in note 9.
12
Refugee Convention, Art. I(a)(2), cited in note 10.
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protect minority groups, the 1970 UNESCO Convention protects religious property through the
protection of cultural heritage. 13
Though the right to freedom of religion is codified in international conventions, it is
unclear how this obligation is enforced through international courts. This paper examines how
four international courts - the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), the International
Court of Justice (ICJ), the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY),
and the International Criminal Court - address the question of the right to freedom of religion. It
also compares this jurisprudence to the jurisprudence of the American Courts, particularly on the
question of the free exercise of religion. Part I focuses on the American Supreme Court’s
conceptualization of the right to freedom of religion. Part II focuses on the PCIJ and the ICJ in
the context of disputes between countries and Part III focuses on the ICTY and the ICC’s
jurisprudence in the criminal context.
I. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICAN LAW
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence governing the right to Free Exercise is relatively
sparse, in part because cases arising under the Free Exercise Clause almost inevitably raise
concerns about the establishment of religion or the right to due process of the law. The principle
that the right to freedom of religion is essential to protect the right to freedom of conscience has
been a part of the American legal system since the founding of the republic. However, the scope
of this protection has remained unclear, in part because the First Amendment specifically
protects religion, but not conscience.

13

Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of
Cultural Property, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, 14 November 1970.
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In the early years of the American republic, the right to freedom of religion was primary
articulated through the writings of James Madison. In his Memorial and Remonstrance Against
Religious Assessments to the Virginia Assembly, Madison argued that “[t]he [r]eligion…of every
man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man
to exercise it as these may dictate.” 14 A similar sentiment was expressed by Jefferson, in his
Letter to a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association, where he says clearly that “religion is
a matter which lies solely between man and his God, and he owes account to none other for his
faith or his worship, that the legislative powers reach actions only, not opinions.” 15 Even those
founders who pushed for greater integration between religion and public life emphasized the
right to free exercise of religion as a way to preserve the integrity of religious belief. 16 In his
letter to the Quakers, George Washington wrote that “it is [his] wish…that the laws may always
be as extensively accommodated to [the conscientious scruples of all men], as a due regard for
the protection and essential interests of the nation may justify and permit.” 17
Though the Founders regarded the right to free exercise of religion as central to the
protections afforded to citizens by the Constitution, the religion clauses were the last protections
offered by the First Amendment to be incorporated against the states. 18 The right to Free
Exercise of religion was applied to the states in 1940, when the Court overturned the convictions

14

James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785) in Michael M. McConnell et
al, Religion and the Constitution 43 (Wolters Kluwer 4th ed, 2016).
15
Thomas Jefferson, Letter to a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association (1802) in Michael M. McConnell et
al, Religion and the Constitution 36 (Wolters Kluwer 4th ed, 2016).
16
See, for example, George Washington, Farewell Address (1796) in Michael M. McConnell et al, Religion and the
Constitution 18 (Wolters Kluwer 4th ed, 2016), “Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity,
religion and morality are indispensable supports.”
17
George Washington, Letter to the Religious Society Called Quakers (1789) in Michael M. McConnell et al,
Religion and the Constitution 36 (Wolters Kluwer 4th ed, 2016).
18
By comparison, the right to free speech was incorporated in 1925 in Gitlow v New York, 268 US 652; the right to
press in 1931 in Near v Minnesota, 283 US 697, the right to peacefully assemble and petition the government in
1937 in DeJonge v Oregon, 299 US 353, and the protection against an establishment of religion in 1947 in Everson
v Board of Education, 330 US 1.
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of three Jehovah’s Witnesses who were charged with breaching the peace for distributing
literature professing their religious beliefs. 19 The Court held that “[t]he fundamental concept of
liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth Amendment] embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First
Amendment.” 20 As such, the “Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states
as incompetent as Congress to enact [laws respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof].” 21 This means that states cannot compel “by law…the acceptance of
any creed or the practice of any form of worship.” 22 The Establishment Clause was incorporated
against the states seven years later, in Everson v Board of Education, 23 where the Court held that
the Establishment Clause “means at least this: [n]either a state nor the Federal Government can
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another.” 24 This also means that the law cannot “force []or influence a person to go
to or to remain way from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in
any religion.” 25
Because the Free Exercise Clause specifically protects against government action that
hinders the free exercise of religion, it applies only to religious activity. 26 Historically, the Court
has struggled with the question of what conduct is protected as part of the protection of the “free
exercise of religion.” When the Court incorporated the Establishment Clause against the states, it
held that the state may not “exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists,

19

Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 US 296, 300 (1940).
Id at 303.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
330 US 1 (1947).
24
Everson v Board of Education of Ewing Township, 330 US 1, 15 (1947).
25
Id.
26
In general, expressions of beliefs or principles that are not religious are protected by other First Amendment
guarantees, particularly the right to freedom of speech and freedom of the press.
20
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Jews, Methodists, non-believers, Presbyterians, or other members of any other faith, because of
their faith, or lack of it.” 27 Public involvement and access to public benefits therefore cannot be
conditioned on a citizen’s religious beliefs, since a state has to be “neutral in its relations with
groups of religious believers and nonbelievers.” 28 At the very least, then, the Constitution
protects against intentional discrimination between religious groups or against religion in
general. 29
The Court has acknowledged that “the ‘exercise of religion’ often involves not only belief
and profession, but the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts.” 30 As such, “a person
who is barred from engaging in religiously motivated conduct is [by definition] barred from
freely exercising his religion.” 31 The foundation of First Amendment protection is “relief from a
burden imposed by the government on religious practices…whether the burden is imposed
directly through laws that prohibit or compel specific religious practices, or indirectly through
laws that in effect make abandonment of one’s own religion…the price of an equal place in the
civil community.” 32
However, beyond this kind of broad protection of conscience and practice, the Court has
struggled to define what constitutes the “free exercise” of religion. Unlike race, which is
relatively easy to define or at least conceptualize, 33 the question of what constitutes the exercise

27

Everson v Board of Education, 330 US 1, 16 (1947).
Id at 18.
29
Sherbert v Verner, 347 US 398, 403 (1963).
30
Employment Division v Smith, 494 US 872, 877 (1990).
31
Id at 892, O’Connor concurring.
32
Id at 897.
33
This does not mean that the boundaries of the term “race” have been uncontested. In Korematsu, the Court held
that classifications based on national origin were treated in the same way as classifications based on race, essentially
collapsing the legal distinction between the two terms in the context of equal protection. The Court has held that
distinctions based on capacity to speak English do not constitute a distinction based on race (See Hernandez v New
York, 500 US 352 (1992)) while classifications based on ancestry can qualify as classifications based on race (See
Rice v Cayetano, 528 US 495 (2000)).
28
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of religion has remained elusive. In Wisconsin v Yoder, the Court emphasized the fact that a
particular tradition or lifestyle had been followed by adherents to the faith for several hundreds
of years. 34 However, while the Court put weight on the longevity of a particular tradition, it said
nothing about whether this kind of longevity is either necessary or sufficient for something to
merit protection. Similarly, the Court has held that “religious beliefs need not be acceptable,
logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others to merit…protection.” 35 It also need not be
consistent with the beliefs articulated by the majority of the followers of the faith itself, as long
as it conforms with the individual’s “understanding of her religion’s requirements.” 36 As such,
the right to free exercise is understood to be a deeply personal one, and courts will rarely inquire
into the validity of an individual’s belief. This belief also does not need to stem from a belief in
God, especially since several belief systems, such as Buddhism and Taoism, which are clearly
protected, do not articulate a belief in God as part of their doctrine. 37
Given this broad understanding of religious belief, the Court has deferred almost entirely to
the litigants to define religious belief and, as such, have conceptualized religious freedom in the
free exercise context as a wholly personal right. In most cases, the question is not whether an
individual’s religious belief is sincere or whether a given course of conduct is part of the
individual’s exercise of his religion but rather whether a statute “burdens” the exercise of that
religion such that it is unconstitutional.

34

Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 US 205, 227-28 (1972).
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc v Hialeah, 508 US 520, 531 (1993).
36
EEOC v Abercrombie and Fitch Stores, Inc, 135 S Ct 2028, 2031 (2015).
37
Torcaso v Watkins, 367 US 488, 495, n 11 (1961).
35
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II. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND DISPUTES BETWEEN COUNTRIES
Unlike the United States Supreme Court, which has adjudicated dozens of cases related
to the scope of religious freedom, the right of individuals and communities to freely exercise
their religion has been considered only six times by either the Permanent Court of International
Justice or its successor, the International Court of Justice. Both the PCIJ and the ICJ were
established to adjudicate disputes between countries arising under international law and, as a
result, have rarely had the opportunity to questions of religious freedom. In part, this is because
the vast majority of issues related to religious freedom arise in the context of disputes between
factions within a state’s borders and therefore, fall outside the jurisdiction of the ICJ. Of the few
instances where disputes related to religious freedom involve multiple countries, the two
countries are rarely in a position to consent to the jurisdiction of the ICJ. As a result, three out of
the six issues before either the PCIJ or the ICJ related to the right to freedom of religion were
advisory opinions rather than judgments. Like the United States Supreme Court, both the PCIJ
and the ICJ understood the right to freedom of religion as a personal one. However, unlike US
domestic law, the right is articulated in the international context as a collective one, and both
courts have protected the right to freedom of religion by protecting the right of communities to
participate in the political process. Part II.A focuses on cases heard by the PCIJ between 1928
and 1935. Part II.B focuses on the ICJ’s cases since 1999.
A. The Permanent Court of International Justice
The Permanent Court of International Justice dealt with the question of minority rights
three times, in the Case Concerning the Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia in 1928, in the
advisory opinion concerning Greco-Bulgarian Communities in 1930 and in the court’s advisory
opinion concerning Minority Schools in Albania, issued in 1935. In all three cases, the PCIJ

9

Anagha Sundararajan

established the obligation of countries to ensure de facto equality for minority communities. This
de facto right included the right of a community to maintain its cultural identity, language, and
religion and to educate its children in its own schools. 38
In the Case Concerning the Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia in 1928, the PCIJ was
called upon to adjudicate a dispute between Poland and Germany arising out of a provision in the
German-Polish convention which allowed minority communities in both countries to choose the
language of instruction for their children. 39 The convention specifically applied to religious and
linguistic minorities in Upper Silesia, a piece of territory divided between the two countries. The
dispute arose because Polish authorities had decided that around 7,000 children who had been
enrolled in German-language schools in Upper Silesia were invalidly registered as religious or
linguistic minorities and therefore had no right to attend schools established for German students
under the convention.
The PCIJ evaluated this case under the Geneva Convention, which guaranteed every
person the right to declare his affiliation to a linguistic or religious group. Because the
individual, had the right to declare (or not) his affiliation to a minority religious or linguistic
group, his government did not have the right to either review this declaration. 40 This standard
was not designed to allow anyone to claim affiliation with any group solely to get a benefit.
Instead, the question of whether an individual belonged to a minority community and therefore,
is entitled to a benefit under law, is a question of fact, not intention. 41 While a government may

38
See Eleni Polymenopoulou, Cultural Rights in the Case Law of the International Court of Justice, 27 Leiden J Intl
L 447 (2014).
39
See Case Concerning Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (Germany v Poland), PCIJ A-No. 15 (1928).
40
Id at 19.
41
Id at 32.
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require an individual to provide some kind of proof of his stated affiliation, a government may
not decide for itself which community an individual belongs to.
The PCIJ applied this standard to Polish government’s actions, saying that the protections
of the Geneva Conventions were designed to avoid any kind of internal discrepancies within a
government about the identification and classification of an individual. The concern was that this
kind of discrepancy would lead to an individual being deprived of a benefit that he was entitled
to as a member of a minority group. 42 While this prohibition may lead to some individuals
unjustly benefiting from a system designed to protect minorities, this is a risk that a government
has to bear. 43 By reviewing and questioning the decisions made by individual parents to enroll
their children in a minority school, the Polish government violated the Geneva Convention’s
mandate.
In reaching this decision, the PCIJ treated religion as both a personal and collective right.
Under the PCIJ’s reasoning, religious minorities have the right to educate their children as they
see fit. As such, minority communities have the right to establish institutions like schools and
places of worship and this right is a collective one. In contrast, the right to freedom of religion is
a personal one, since individuals have the right to decide which group they belong to. The
individual, not the community or the government, has the right to identify as a member of a
minority community and to choose where and how his children are educated. In this case and
subsequent ones, the PCIJ adopted a hybrid conceptualization of the right to freedom of religion.
The court upheld this model of minority rights in 1930, in its advisory opinion
concerning the rights of minority groups in Green and Bulgaria. There, the court considered the
obligations imposed by the two states by a bilateral reciprocal emigration treaty. As part of its

42
43

Id at 34.
Germany v Poland, PCIJ Series A, No.15, 35.
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decision, the court held that, as part of this communal right to religion, minority communities
had the right to maintain their traditions and way of life. 44
The right was reaffirmed in the court’s advisory opinion about Minority Schools in
Albania five years later, in 1935. There, the Court was called upon to advise the government of
Albania on its duties and obligations to citizens within its borders who belonged to racial,
religious, or linguistic minority groups under a Treaty and Decision by the League of Nations to
which it was a party. 45 The Court stated that individuals who belonged to minority communities
were entitled to same rights and protections both in law and in fact as all other citizens. In
practice, this meant both that racial and religious minorities were entitled to the same rights as
majority communities, but this equality had to functional rather than formal. 46 Since the goal of
the convention and other legal documents was both to ensure equality and to preserve the
identity of the minority group, equality in fact under the Convention may require something
more than purely neutral policies. 47 Instead, a government was obligated to consider the special
needs of a community and incorporate these needs into its legal system, even if this meant that
communities received differential treatment. 48
In reaching this conclusion, the Court conceptualizes religious rights as communal ones.
It focused solely on the fact that minority communities had the right, by virtue of this communal
identity, to have their traditions respected and protected by the laws of their state. Rather than
examining an individual’s right to freely exercise his faith, the Court focused on the right of the
group to carry on their way of life and enjoy the same rights as the majority community.

44

Eleni Polymenopoulou, 27 Leiden J Intl L 447 (2014).
Minority Schools in Albania, Advisory Opinion, Series A/B, No 64 (1935).
46
Id at 15.
47
Id at 17.
48
Id.
45
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Ultimately, this communal right is as important, if not more so, than the individual one because
the individual right to worship freely is dependent on a state honoring the community.
B. The International Court of Justice
Unlike the PCIJ, the International Court of Justice has no explicit mandate to consider
and adjudicate questions related to minority treaties or treaties related to cultural rights. As a
result, the ICJ has seen three cases that could be considered related to cultural rights and only
one of the three explicitly relates to the rights of minority groups.
The ICJ’s most prominent decision relating to cultural rights and cultural property is the
Case Concerning the Temple Preah Vihear, between Cambodia and Thailand. 49 This case arose
after an armed occupation of the Temple of Preah Vihear, a religious site on the border between
Cambodia and Thailand, resulted in large-scale looting. The Court held that, because the temple
was situated on Cambodia’s territory, the temple and its religious artifacts belonged to
Cambodia, regardless of the significance of the temple to religious groups in Thailand. 50 Though
this case concerned religious property, the Court said nothing about the rights of religious
minorities in either state.
The Court first considered the rights of religious minorities in 2004, when the Security
Counsel certified the question of the legality of a wall constructed by Israel on Palestinian
territory to the Court. 51 In its advisory opinion, the Court held that the right to freedom of
movement included the right to access the holy sites that were central to one’s religious beliefs. 52
Because Israel was a state party to the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), it was obligated under this Convention to ensure that Christians, Jews, and Muslims

49

Case Concerning the Temple Preah Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand), 1962 ICJ 6 (1962).
See generally, id.
51
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004 ICJ 136.
52
Id at ¶ 129.
50
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living within its territory had access to their holy sites in Jerusalem. This obligation extended to
Palestinians living in the West Bank and, more importantly, did not operate only during armed
conflict. 53 As such, Israel had the obligation to ensure that Muslim Palestinians and Jewish
Israelis could continue to access Islamic holy sites, even during peace-time.
By tying the right to access to holy sites to the right to movement under the ICCPR, the
ICJ cabined the right to make it a purely individual one. Rather than address the right of the
Muslim population at large to worship or conduct ceremonies, the Court focused on the right of
any individual Muslim to access his holy sites. More importantly, because the opinion was
purely advisory and focused only on the wall, rather than the larger concern about the conflict
between Israel and Palestine, the opinion has little effect. It also provides little guidance about
how the Court will consider broader questions about the rights of religious minorities in the
future.
The only other case in which the Court explicitly considered the rights of minorities was
in 2007, when the Court applied the Genocide Convention to the massacre at Srebrenica and
other atrocities committed during the Bosnian war in the 1990s. 54 There, the Court held that, in
order to be a crime of genocide, a particular act had to be committed with the intent to destroy a
particular group. 55 This includes acts committed with the intent to kill a particular religious
groups because of their religious beliefs. 56 Based on this criteria, the Court held that the
massacre of thousands of Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica was a crime of genocide.

53

Id at ¶ 103.
Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), 2007 ICJ 43.
55
Id at 190.
56
Id at 191.
54

14

Anagha Sundararajan

The Court also considered whether the intentional destruction of Islamic and Catholic
religious sites constituted a crime under the Genocide Convention. Though the Genocide
Convention only criminalized intentional violence against populations, the Court held that the
deliberate destruction of historical, cultural, or religious sites was evidence of the requisite intent
to destroy a particular social group under the Convention. 57 However, the destruction of cultural
property itself was not a form of genocide, though it was a violation of the laws and customs of
war. In focusing on genocide, the Court again considered religion as a collective or communal
right, since religion served to define a protected population for the purposes of the Genocide
Convention.
Though the ICJ and the PCIJ have only considered the rights of minority religious groups
in a handful of contexts, both courts have suggested that the right to freedom of religion is both
an individual right based on an individual’s conscience and a communal right, honored as a way
to protect a population’s traditions and way of life. However, unlike its predecessor, the ICJ’s
rulings on this question have been narrower. As such, the ICJ’s jurisprudence has provided little
actual protection to minority religious groups around the world, including those in states which
may be subject to the ICJ’s jurisdiction. Litigation centered on protecting the cultural and
religious rights of minority populations has largely taken place in domestic courts, meaning
minority populations remain vulnerable legally.
III. RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
Unlike the cases before the PCIJ and the ICJ, cases before international criminal tribunals
which touch on the rights of religious minorities focus almost exclusively on the rights of
minority communities to their religious cultural symbols, rather than than the rights of the

57

Id at 344.
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individual members of these minority communities. The International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) have both focused
exclusively on the destruction of religious property and sacred sites during armed conflicts. In
part, this focus is driven by the jurisdiction of the two tribunals: both tribunals assign criminal
penalties to individuals who violate the laws of war and commit crimes of genocide or crimes
against humanity. As such, cases before these bodies focus almost exclusively on acts committed
by an individual or group of individuals against a group. Part III.A focuses on the judgements by
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia that focused on attacks against
Bosnian Muslim communities. III.B examines the Al Mahdi decision by the International
Criminal Court, which is the first, and currently only, decision by that body to focus on cultural
rights under the Rome Statute.
A. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
The cases before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia that
relate to the rights of religious minority communities have focused almost exclusively on
allegations of plunder and excessive destruction of property, in violation of the laws and customs
of war and the Geneva Conventions.
One of the earliest cases decided by ICTY (and one of the first cases since Nuremberg
determining individual guilt in relation to violations of international humanitarian law) focused
specifically on military action against a religious minority in northwest Bosnia. Dusko Tadić, a
Bosnian Serb military leader, was charged in connection with acts committed during the Bosnian
Serb army’s attack on the town of Kozarac, in northwest Bosnia. 58 As part of this military
campaign, Tadić was found guilty of specifically targeting, persecuting, and forcibly moving
See generally, Judgment of the Trial Chamber in the Tadić Case, Summary of the Verdict, ICTY, Judgment of 7
May 1997.

58
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Bosnian Muslim communities from their homes. In particular, Tadić was accused and found
guilty of beating Muslim prisoners in the Omarska camp and forcibly removing Muslim men and
boys from several villages. 59 The tribunal specifically held that, by separating the population
based on religion and subjecting the Muslim population of northwest Bosnia to deportation and
torture, Tadić engaged in religious persecution in violation of the laws and customs of war. 60
Because the charges against the defendant were based on the Geneva Conventions and the laws
of war, the tribunal’s focus was on the defendant’s actions and intent with respect to a
community, though the charges themselves were formulated based on the defendant’s actions
toward an individual. 61
The tribunal adopted a the same approach in the case against Dario Kordić and Mario
Čerkez. Kordić, a political leader, and Čerkez, a military commander, were jointly prosecuted for
crimes against humanity for military action which targeted and sought to destroy Bosnian
Muslim communities in central Bosnia. 62 The two defendants allegedly deliberately targeted
mosques and other religious institutions as part of a common plan to destroy the Bosnian Muslim
community and ethnically cleanse the region. 63 Like the ICJ, the tribunal held that the intentional
destruction of religious monuments functioned as evidence of a systematic campaign against a
particular religious groups and violated the laws and customs of war under the Geneva
Conventions. 64
In particular, this case is notable for two reasons. Unlike the Tadić case, this case focused
on both the inhumane treatment of members of a minority religious group and the destruction of

59

Id.
Id.
61
Id.
62
See generally, Judgement of the Trial Chamber in the Kordić and Čerkez Case, Summary of the Verdict, ICTY,
Judgment of 26 February 2001.
63
Id.
64
Id.
60
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religious property, including mosques and schools. It treats both as violations of the rules of war
and, again, focuses on the rights of a group to establish religious institutions and have access to
the symbols of their religious beliefs though the lens of individual acts committed by the
defendants. In other words, the case holds that the rules of war prevent the wanton destruction of
religious institutions and monuments, implying that the rules of war are designed to preserve as
much as possible the rights of religious minorities to practice their religion and access places of
worship. Second, the case is notable because it is one of the first cases before a modern criminal
tribunal to hold a political leader accountable for inciting crimes against a minority community. 65
More recently, ICTY has heard two cases that implicate cultural rights in some way. In
2004, the tribunal sentenced Miodrag Jokić to seven years imprisonment for crimes committed
during the siege of the city of Dubrovnik, despite ongoing negotiations for a cease fire. 66
Because Jokić pled guilty to violating the laws and customs of war by attacking civilian
populations and cultural sites, the tribunal did not consider evidence related to these charges. 67
The Appeals Chamber ultimately affirmed the conviction, but modified the sentence to reflect
only those instances where the defendant was responsible as a superior officer for instructing his
men to destroy religious sites. 68 As such, though the intentional destruction of religious and
cultural landmarks was considered a war crime and a violation of the rights of the civilian
populations living in the area, only those officers who were in a supervisory role at the time of
the destruction were liable personally for these crimes. The Trial Chamber reached the same
conclusion in 2011, when it found Ante Gotovina, Ivan Čermak, and Mladen Markač liable for a
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joint criminal enterprise with the goal of removing civilians from minority populations from
Croatia through force or the threat of force. 69 Part of the joint criminal enterprise was the attack
and plunder of civilian targets, including areas of cultural importance.
Because of ICTY’s role in prosecuting autocracies committed during armed conflict in
the Balkans in the 1990s, the cases heard by the tribunal relating to minority rights focused
primarily on the destruction of cultural and religious property.However, by saying that the
intentional destruction of religious property constituted a violation of the laws and customs of
war, the tribunal also articulated a version of minority rights based on the rights f a community to
access houses of worship and its sacred shrines. This right is identical to the one articulated by
the ICJ in its advisory opinion relating to the Wall on Palestinian Territory. 70 ICTY’s
jurisprudence, combined with this advisory opinion from the ICJ, suggest that while the right of
a minority group to worship freely during peace time is rarely protected by international law, the
rights of a minority population to preserve and access their sacred sites is protected through the
protection of the sites themselves.
B. The International Criminal Court
Like ICTY, the International Criminal Court has only considered minority rights in the
context of the prohibition against the intentional destruction of cultural and religious property.
The ICC has considered this issue once, in the Case of the Prosecutor v Ahmad al Faqi al
Mahdi. 71 There, the Court considered charges against Al Mahdi, an Islamic cleric who worked
with Al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali to specifically target religious practices
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deemed contrary to the teachings of AQIM. As part of this campaign, Al Mahdi and others
targeted and destroyed religious sites of cultural and historic importance around Mali, including
mausoleums and shrines. 72 The Court held that this destruction constituted a war crime under
Article 8(2)(e)(ii) of the Rome Statute, which prohibits attacks against civilian targets during
armed conflict. The Court also held that the attacks violated both the Geneva Convention and the
Second Protocol to the Hague Convention, and as such, constituted a criminal act within the
Court's jurisdiction. 73
The Court ultimately sentenced Al Mahdi to nine years in prison for the destruction of
these monuments, holding that these crimes were committed with the intent to impose a specific
religion on the population of Timbuktu through armed conflict. 74 The religious sites targeted
were specifically protected by the UNESCO Convention and they were destroyed because of
their cultural significance to the local population. As such, Al Mahdi not only intended to
traumatize the local population through a campaign of terror, he also intended to rob the
population of religious and cultural symbols vital to its identity. 75
Though the ICC’s holding in the Al Mahdi case, like cases heard by ICTY, is limited
specifically to the destruction of religious monuments during wartime, the Court’s rhetoric in the
case suggests a broader conception of the protection of religious rights. Like ICTY, the Court
focuses specifically on the right of a population to its cultural and historic sites, especially to
shrines that have been part of the area’s tradition and history for generations. However, the Court
also suggests that these acts become more serious when committed as part of a systematic
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program of imposing religious beliefs on a population. 76 This raises the possibility that, in the
future, the Court will be more willing to look into a country’s practices relating to its treatment
of minority religious groups.
However, the ICC’s holding in the Al Mahdi case is limited in a few important ways,
which again suggest that the vast majority of protections afforded to religious minorities come
from domestic, rather than international law. First, the Al Mahdi case rests on Article 8(2)(e) of
the Rome Statute, which defines war crimes, meaning its holding is limited to the context of
armed conflict. Therefore, the Al Mahdi case cannot be used to target practices by world leaders
during peace time. Second, the ICC’s jurisdiction itself is limited by the Rome Statute, and by
the fact that it has a limited enforcement mechanism, so even if the ICC chooses to inquire more
deeply into a state’s policies with respect to its minority groups, it is unclear whether this inquiry
will actually be meaningful or function as a way to protect minority populations. Finally, the Al
Mahdi case is currently the only case in which the ICC has charged and convicted someone for
the destruction of cultural property, and it is unclear how (and if) the ICC’s jurisprudence in this
area will evolve in the future.
CONCLUSION
Though the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Convention on
Civil and Political Rights articulate the right to freedom of religion as a deeply personal one,
international tribunals, including the ICJ, the ICC, and ICTY have all conceptualized this right
primarily as a communal one. Unlike the jurisprudence of the American Supreme Court, which
has protected the freedom of religion by protecting individuals, international tribunals have
overwhelmingly opted to protect freedom of religion by protecting the rights of minority
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communities to educate their children and maintain access to their sacred sites. As a result,
international law does very little work toward protecting the right to free exercise of religion for
minority communities outside the context of an armed conflict.
In part, this is due to the jurisdictional constraints placed on international tribunals. It is
rare for a question concerning free exercise of religion to be heard by a body like the ICC or the
ICJ outside of the context of armed conflict, or at least hostility. This lack of protection is also
driven by the conceptualization of religion as a communal right, since it requires only that a
community be allowed to exist, not that the individual members of the community be able to
participate fully and freely in the political process. As a result, international law is fundamentally
weak in the area of protecting and enforcing the ICCPR’s mandate that every individual have the
right to freedom of conscience.
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